The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 2, 2026 in United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 — and what unfolded exposes a fundamental structural flaw in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the federal law that strips gun rights from anyone who is “an unlawful user of or addicted to” a controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. Ali Danial Hemani is a Texas man found with a Glock 9mm and roughly sixty grams of marijuana who admitted to using cannabis approximately every other day. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the § 922(g)(3) charge on Second Amendment as-applied grounds (No. 24-40137, Jan. 31, 2025), and now the government is asking SCOTUS to reverse. Based on how argument went, I do not think the government made its case — but I will be honest about why the outcome is still far from certain.
The Rahimi Framework Is the Starting Point
Before you can evaluate Hemani, you need the rule from United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Chief Justice Roberts wrote for an 8-1 Court and held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) — disarming someone subject to a domestic-violence civil restraining order — is constitutional under the Second Amendment where a court has already found that person poses a credible threat to another’s physical safety. The constitutional linchpin is an individualized finding of violent dangerousness.
Zackey Rahimi made that finding easy. He admitted in family court proceedings to slamming his girlfriend’s head against a car dashboard, then fired a gun at a witness. A court looked at those facts and found him dangerous. Disarmament followed from that adjudication. That is the model: a prior hearing, specific evidence, a judicial finding.
Hemani is a different animal entirely — and that difference is where the government’s case unravels.
Two Ways to Establish Dangerousness — Hemani Fits Neither
There are two well-established paths by which a person can be found to be a violent danger under our legal system. The first is a civil commitment or family court proceeding: a hearing, witness testimony, medical records, and a judicial finding that the specific individual poses a violent threat. Think of the civil commitment framework — a court looks at the person in front of it and concludes they are dangerous.
The second path is a criminal conviction for a violent offense. If someone is convicted of murder, aggravated assault, or armed robbery, that conviction is itself an adjudication — beyond a reasonable doubt — that the person engaged in violent conduct. Disarmament flowing from that is straightforward.
Hemani fits neither category. There was no civil commitment hearing focused on whether he is dangerous. He has never been convicted of a violent crime. The only thing he has been adjudicated on is being an unlawful user of a controlled substance while possessing a firearm. That is the charge. And that is precisely the problem.
The CSA Schedules Were Never Designed to Answer the Danger Question
Here is the core of the case, and the Supreme Court zeroed in on it during argument. Section 922(g)(3) does not define its own list of disqualifying drugs. Instead, Congress incorporated by reference the schedules from the Controlled Substances Act. Whatever is a Schedule I, II, or III controlled substance under the CSA is thereby a disqualifying substance under § 922(g)(3).
But the CSA schedules exist for an entirely different purpose. When Congress and the executive branch classify a drug on a CSA schedule, the questions being asked are pharmacological: Does this drug have medicinal value? Is it addictive? What are the health risks to the user? The FDA and DEA assess those considerations. Nobody — not the scientists, not the pharmacologists, not the FDA, not anyone involved in the scheduling process — was ever asked whether a person who ingests a particular drug becomes a violent danger to third parties.
The two statutory schemes are, in a word, apples and oranges. The CSA classification of marijuana as Schedule I tells you nothing about whether a marijuana user poses a physical threat to others. That question was simply never part of the scheduling analysis. So when the government comes into court under § 922(g)(3) and says “Hemani used a Schedule I substance, therefore he can be disarmed,” they are trying to bridge two statutory frameworks that have no logical connection on the question that Rahimi says actually matters: individual violent dangerousness.
The Justices pressed DOJ hard on this, and the government’s answers were not persuasive. The Court also noted that DOJ appeared to be conflating the “unlawful user” and “addicted to” language in § 922(g)(3) in ways that blurred the statute’s meaning — raising a separate void-for-vagueness concern alongside the Second Amendment challenge.
Why I Still Fear the Wrong Outcome
I want to be direct here: the legal argument that § 922(g)(3) cannot be constitutionally applied to Hemani is strong. The government has not made an individualized finding of violent dangerousness. The CSA schedule tells us nothing about whether marijuana users are violent. The Rahimi framework, properly applied, should result in the charge being dismissed.
But I have been saying from the start that this is a coin flip — and here is why. Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts are known to have little sympathy for illegal drug use and drug cases. If their personal distaste for the underlying conduct drives their jurisprudence here, they vote to uphold the conviction. If the three liberal justices — Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson — align with them, that is five votes to reverse the Fifth Circuit. Hemani loses 5-4, and a seriously flawed gun prohibition survives another day.
My hope is that the legal framework wins out over the optics. The government failed to prove Hemani is a violent danger. That is not a drug policy judgment — it is a constitutional requirement under Rahimi, and the Court should hold them to it.
This article is based on analysis by Professor Mark W. Smith, constitutional attorney and Host of the Four Boxes Diner 2nd Amendment channel. Watch the original video here. This does not constitute legal advice.