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SCOTUS Denies Cert in Corbett v. Hochul — Here's Why You Shouldn't Panic

Mark W. Smith Mark W. Smith
16:18
Mark's Hot Take
The Supreme Court's refusal to hear Corbett v. Hochul is not a setback for the Second Amendment — a cert denial carries zero precedential weight, says nothing about the merits, and this particular petition was never going to survive scrutiny of its procedural posture.
— Mark W. Smith Share on X

The Supreme Court declined on June 15, 2026, to hear Jonathan Corbett v. Kathy Hochul, No. 25-1261 — a Second Amendment challenge to New York’s concealed-carry training mandate under the Concealed Carry Improvement Act. If you’re seeing alarming headlines about a devastating loss, set them aside. A denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits. The Court expressed no view on whether New York’s training requirements are constitutional. It declined to add this case to its docket, and there are concrete procedural reasons why that outcome was predictable.

What a Cert Denial Actually Means

When the Supreme Court denies certiorari, it issues no holding. It decides nothing about the underlying constitutional question. The lower-court ruling remains in place but acquires no new precedential authority from the denial. It means, simply, that four justices did not vote to grant review. The Court processes thousands of petitions each term and grants a small fraction. Denial is the default, not the exception, and reading substantive meaning into it is a category error.

Three Reasons This Petition Was Not Ready for the High Court

The petition in Corbett v. Hochul presented a legitimate legal question: whether footnote 9 of NYSRPA v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), creates a presumption of constitutionality for a shall-issue regime’s firearms training mandate that relieves the government of its Bruen historical-tradition burden. That question is real and consequential. But legitimate questions do not by themselves earn a grant, and this petition carried three procedural liabilities.

First, the petitioner, Jonathan Corbett — a California-licensed attorney litigating pro se — is a California resident seeking to carry a firearm in New York. Article III standing was not clearly resolved, and the Court’s attention gravitates toward petitions where the claimant’s concrete, ongoing injury is unmistakable. A California practitioner seeking a New York City permit presents an attenuated factual nexus.

Second, and more decisively, the case arrived in an interlocutory posture — an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. No court below had adjudicated the merits of the training mandate. The Supreme Court strongly prefers to resolve constitutional questions on fully developed records after final judgment. Compare Wolford v. Lopez, No. 24-1046, the pending Hawaii “no-carry default” case argued January 20, 2026: that petition presented a clean, discrete question with active Trump administration DOJ support. No equivalent combination existed here.

Third, the Court did not request a response from New York before denying the petition — a recognized signal that the justices did not regard the petition as certworthy. The absence of a call for a response is meaningful; it suggests the petition did not clear even the threshold for serious consideration.

The Real Fight Over Footnote 9

None of this means the legal question Corbett raised is unimportant. My read is that footnote 9 has become one of the most consequential and most abused passages in modern Second Amendment jurisprudence, and the Court will eventually have to clarify it.

Here is what the Bruen majority actually wrote:

To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ “shall-issue” licensing regimes, under which “a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].” Because these licensing regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily prevent “law-abiding, responsible citizens” from exercising their Second Amendment right to public carry… . That said, because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry.

NYSRPA v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, n.9 (2022).

Anti-gun jurisdictions have seized on the first half of that passage and read it as a blanket endorsement of every requirement embedded in any shall-issue regime. That reading is wrong. What footnote 9 said is that the Bruen decision was not striking down the 43 shall-issue states — regimes that function as objective, non-discretionary licensing systems, unlike New York’s old “proper cause” scheme. It did not certify every individual requirement within those regimes as constitutionally immune from challenge. The Bruen text-and-history framework still applies to specific mandates, and the burden still rests with the government to justify each one through historical tradition — the methodology established by D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and incorporated against the states by McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), analogy is apt: if a nominal poll tax is an unconstitutional condition on the right to vote, then exorbitant fees or effectively unavailable training can similarly burden the Second Amendment right.

What the Court Is Actually Looking At

I have been arguing for some time that the Court is working through Second Amendment questions in a deliberate sequence. The docket already contains matters involving semi-automatic rifles, magazine restrictions, sensitive places, and the rights of young adults. Concealed-carry licensing will return to the Court — but in a vehicle designed to present the question cleanly, with a fully developed merits record, and likely involving the kind of concrete abuse footnote 9 itself identified: prohibitive fees, or jurisdictions that mandate training while providing no accessible opportunity to obtain it.

Corbett v. Hochul was the wrong vehicle at the wrong procedural moment, without a circuit split on the footnote 9 question and without the executive-branch alignment that helped propel Wolford to argument. The cert denial tells us nothing about where the Court’s conservative majority stands on training mandates or the CCIA. Those questions remain live and unresolved. The Second Amendment’s future is not written in what the Court declined to hear today — it is being written in the cases the Court has already agreed to decide.


This article is based on analysis by Professor Mark W. Smith, constitutional attorney and Host of the Four Boxes Diner 2nd Amendment channel. Watch the original video here. This does not constitute legal advice.

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