The Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, on June 21, 2024, by a vote of 8 to 1. Nothing about that is new. But the Court’s recording of the Chief Justice announcing the opinion from the bench is worth revisiting now, because two terms of decisions have since made Rahimi easier to read correctly. It was never the threat to the Second Amendment that many on our side feared. It is a narrow holding that applies the Heller and Bruen method, and it now sits beside United States v. Hemani as one of two pillars marking where government may lawfully disarm.
What Rahimi Actually Decided
Zackey Rahimi grabbed his girlfriend by the wrist in a parking lot in December 2019, shoved her into his car so that her head struck the dashboard, and fired a gun as she fled. A Texas court then issued a restraining order that included a finding that he posed a credible threat to her physical safety and suspended his gun license. Months later he was arrested for threatening another woman with a firearm, and police found a pistol, a rifle, and ammunition in his residence. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which bars firearm possession by a person subject to such an order.
The Fifth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023). The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for eight Justices, with Justice Thomas alone in dissent. The majority drew the boundary of its holding in a single sentence:
“Rather, we conclude only this: An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.”
That sentence is the whole case. Rahimi had notice and an opportunity to contest the evidence against him and did not. The Court did not announce a general power to disarm anyone a legislature deems dangerous.
Surety Laws and Affray Laws
The Court reached its result through the Bruen method. Section 922(g)(8) burdens conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text, so the burden shifted to the government to identify a historical tradition of comparable regulation. The test asks whether the modern law is relevantly similar to its predecessors in how and why it restricts arms. It demands a historical analogue, not a historical twin.
The government supplied two. Surety laws, a civil mechanism, allowed a magistrate to require a person who threatened others to post a bond to keep the peace. Going-armed, or affray, laws were criminal and punished those who rode about armed to terrorize the public, with forfeiture of arms and imprisonment. From these the majority concluded:
“Our tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.”
The Court also distinguished the statute from the New York law struck down in Bruen, observing that Section 922(g)(8) “does not broadly restrict arms use by the public generally.” Each feature that made the old laws acceptable is present here: the disarmament is temporary, it is backed by the threat of imprisonment, and it operates only after a judge has made a finding.
Why I Counseled Calm
When the decision came down, much of the commentary declared it the end of Bruen. I wrote the opposite in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy in July 2024, in an article entitled “Much Ado About Nothing: Rahimi Reinforces Bruen and Heller.” My advice then was not to panic, and the record since has borne it out.
In Hemani, decided 9 to 0 on June 18, 2026, the Court struck down the application of the federal drug-user ban to a marijuana user whom no court had found dangerous, and it invoked Rahimi in the gun owner’s favor. In Wolford v. Lopez, the Court rejected Hawaii’s default rule barring carry on private property open to the public. Neither outcome is consistent with the claim that Rahimi hollowed out the right.
Two Grounds, Not a Blank Check
My own synthesis, offered as my reading and not as a holding, is that these decisions are converging on two grounds for disarmament. The first is a judicial finding that a person poses a violent physical danger to himself or others, which supports a temporary disarmament. The second is the misuse of arms: using a firearm to commit rape, robbery, or murder. Both have deep roots in the historical tradition. Neither authorizes disarming a person merely because he belongs to a disfavored class.
This is not a concession to gun control. Violent criminals and the dangerously mentally ill should not be armed, and the second reason is strategic as well as moral. High-profile misuse of firearms is what produces demands for new restrictions. Connecticut’s post-Sandy Hook legislation is the plainest example; the AR-15 ban that Edward Grant challenges in Grant v. Higgins traces to that response.
That case and Viramontes v. Cook County are set for argument on December 2, 2026. I expect the Court to apply the same method it used in Rahimi and Hemani, and that expectation leads me to forecast a win for gun owners. It is a forecast, not a result. What the Court has already shown is that it will demand history and will not accept a government’s assertion of danger in place of it.
This article is based on analysis by Professor Mark W. Smith, constitutional attorney and Host of the Four Boxes Diner 2nd Amendment channel. Watch the original video here. This does not constitute legal advice.